Section 10: Powers Denied to the States - Constitutions - VLEX 295833

Section 10: Powers Denied to the States

CONTENT
Clause 1. Making Treaties, Coining Money, Ex Post Facto Laws, Impairing Contracts

Clause 1. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

Treaties, Alliances, or Confederations

At the time of the Civil War, this clause was one of the provisions upon which the Court relied in holding that the Confederation formed by the seceding States could not be recognized as having any legal existence. Today, its practical significance lies in the limitations which it implies upon the power of the States to deal with matters having a bearing upon international relations. In the early case of Holmes v. Jennison, Chief Justice Taney invoked it as a reason for holding that a State had no power to deliver up a fugitive from justice to a foreign State. More recently, the kindred idea that the responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations rests exclusively with the Federal Government prompted the Court to hold that, since the oil under the three mile marginal belt along the California coast might well become the subject of international dispute and since the ocean, including this three mile belt, is of vital consequence to the nation in its desire to engage in commerce and to live in peace with the world, the Federal Government has paramount rights in and power over that belt, including full dominion over the resources of the soil under the water area. In Skiriotes v. Florida, the Court, on the other hand, ruled that this clause did not disable Florida from regulating the manner in which its own citizens may engage in sponge fishing outside its territorial waters. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Hughes declared; "When its action does not conflict with federal legislation, the sovereign authority of the State over the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas is analogous to the sovereign authority of the United States over its citizens in like circumstances."

Bills of Credit

Within the sense of the Constitution, bills of credit signify a paper medium of exchange, intended to circulate between individuals, and between the Government and individuals, for the ordinary purposes of society. It is immaterial whether the quality of legal tender is imparted to such paper. Interest bearing certificates, in denominations not exceeding ten dollars, which were issued by loan offices established by the State of Missouri and made receivable in payment of taxes or other moneys due to the State, and in payment of the fees and salaries of state officers, were held to be bills of credit whose issuance was banned by this section. The States are not forbidden, however, to issue coupons receivable for taxes, nor to execute instruments binding themselves to pay money at a future day for services rendered or money borrowed. Bills issued by state banks are not bills of credit; it is immaterial that the State is the sole stockholder of the bank, that the officers of the bank were elected by the state legislature, or that the capital of the bank was raised by the sale of state bonds.

Legal Tender

Relying on this clause, which applies only to the States and not to the Federal Government, the Supreme Court has held that where the marshal of a state court received state bank notes in payment and discharge of an execution, the creditor was entitled to demand payment in gold or silver. Since, however, there is nothing in the Constitution prohibiting a bank depositor from consenting when he draws a check that payment may be made by draft, a state law providing that checks drawn on local banks should, at the option of the bank, be payable in exchange drafts was held valid.

Bills of Attainder

Statutes passed after the Civil War with the intent and result of excluding persons who had aided the Confederacy from following certain callings, by the device of requiring them to take an oath that they had never given such aid, were held invalid as being bills of attainder, as well as ex post facto laws.

Other attempts to raise bill-of-attainder claims have been unsuccessful. A Court majority denied that a municipal ordinance that required all employees to execute oaths that they had never been affiliated with Communist or similar organizations, violated the clause, on the grounds that the ordinance merely provided standards of qualifications and eligibility for employment. A law that prohibited any person convicted of a felony and not subsequently pardoned from holding office in a waterfront union was not a bill of attainder because the "distinguishing feature of a bill of attainder is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt" and the prohibition "embodies no further implications of appellant's guilt than are contained in his 1920 judicial conviction."

Ex Post Facto Laws

Scope of the Provision.-This clause, like the cognate restriction imposed on the Federal Government by § 9, relates only to penal and criminal legislation and not to civil laws that affect private rights adversely.

Distinguishing between civil and penal laws was at the heart of the Court's decision in Smith v. Doe upholding application of Alaska's "Megan's Law" to sex offenders who were convicted before the law's enactment. The Alaska law requires released sex offenders to register with local police and also provides for public notification via the Internet. The Court accords "considerable deference" to legislative intent; if the legislature's purpose was to enact a civil regulatory scheme, then the law can be ex post facto only if there is "the clearest proof" of punitive effect. Here, the Court determined, the legislative intent was civil and non-punitive-to promote public safety by "protecting the public from sex offenders." The Court then identified several "useful guideposts" to aid analysis of whether a law intended to be non-punitive nonetheless has punitive effect. Registration and public notification of sex offenders are of recent origin, and are not viewed as a "traditional means of punishment." The Act does not subject the registrants to an "affirmative disability or restraint"; there is no physical restraint or occupational disbarment, and there is no restraint or supervision of living conditions, as there can be under conditions of probation. The fact that the law might deter future crimes does not make it punitive. All that is required, the Court explained, is a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose, and the statute need not be narrowly tailored to that end. Nor is the act "excessive" in relation to its regulatory purpose. Rather, "the means chosen are 'reasonable' in light of the [state's] non-punitive objective" of promoting public safety by giving its citizens information about former sex offenders, who, as a group, have an alarmingly high rate of recidivism.

There are three categories of ex post facto laws: those "which punish[ ] as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which make[ ] more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; or which deprive[ ] one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed." The bar is directed only against legislative action and does not touch erroneous or inconsistent decisions by the courts.

The fact that a law is ex post facto and invalid as to crimes committed prior to its enactment does not affect its validity as to subsequent offenses. A statute that mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time the crime was committed, or merely penalizes the continuance of conduct lawfully begun before its passage, is not ex post facto. Thus, measures penalizing the failure of a railroad to cut drains through existing embankments or making illegal the continued possession of intoxicating liquors which were lawfully acquired have been held valid.

Denial of Future Privileges to Past Offenders.-The right to practice a profession may be denied to one who was convicted of an offense before the statute was enacted if the offense reasonably may be regarded as a continuing disqualification for the profession. Without offending the Constitution, statutes barring a person from practicing medicine after conviction of a felony or excluding convicted felons from waterfront union offices unless pardoned or in receipt of a parole board's good conduct certificate, may be enforced against a person convicted before the measures were passed. But the test oath prescribed after the Civil War, whereby office holders, teachers, or preachers were required to swear that they had not participated in the Rebellion, was held invalid on the ground that it had no reasonable relation to fitness to perform official or professional duties, but rather was a punishment for past offenses. A similar oath required of suitors in the courts also was held void.

Changes in Punishment. Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull gave an alternative description of the four categories of ex post facto laws, two of which related to punishment. One such category was laws that inflict punishment "where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment"; the other was laws that inflict greater punishment than was authorized when the crime was committed.

Illustrative of the first of these punishment categories is "a law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable statute of limitations period [as] applied to revive a previously time- barred prosecution." Such a law, the Court ruled in Stogner v. California, is prohibited as ex post facto. Courts that had upheld extension of unexpired statutes of limitation had been careful to distinguish situations in which the limitations periods have expired. The Court viewed revival of criminal liability after the law had granted a person "effective amnesty" as being "unfair" in the sense addressed by the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Illustrative of the second punishment category are statutes that changed an indeterminate sentence law to require a judge to impose the maximum sentence, that required solitary confinement for prisoners previously sentenced to death, and that allowed a warden to fix, within limits of one week, and keep secret the time of execution. Because it made more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment, a law, a law that altered sentencing guidelines to make it more likely the sentencing authority would impose on a defendant a more severe sentence than was previously likely and making it impossible for the defendant to challenge the sentence was ex post facto as to one who had committed the offense prior to the change. But laws providing heavier penalties for new crimes thereafter committed by habitual criminals, changing the punishment from hanging to electrocution, fixing the place therefor in the penitentiary, and permitting the presence of a greater number of invited witnesses, or providing for close confinement of six to nine months in the penitentiary, in lieu of three to six months in jail prior to execution, and substituting the warden for the sheriff as hangman, have been sustained.

In Dobbert v. Florida, the Court may have formulated a new test for determining when a criminal statute vis-a-vis punishment is ex post facto. Defendant murdered two of his children; at the time of the commission of the offenses, Florida law provided the death penalty upon conviction for certain takings of life. Subsequent to the commission of the capital offenses, the Supreme Court held capital sentencing laws similar to Florida's unconstitutional, although convictions obtained under the statutes were not to be overturned, and the Florida Supreme Court voided its death penalty statutes on the authority of the High Court decision. The Florida legislature then enacted a new capital punishment law, which was sustained. Dobbert was convicted and sentenced to death under the new law, which was enacted after the commission of his offenses. The Court rejected the ex post facto challenge to the sentence on the basis that whether the old statute was constitutional or not, "it clearly indicated Florida's view of the severity of murder and of the degree of punishment which the legislature wished to impose upon murderers. The statute was intended to provide maximum deterrence, and its existence on the statute books provided fair warning as to the degree of culpability which the State ascribed to the act of murder." Whether the "fair warning" standard is to have any prominent place in ex post facto jurisprudence may be an interesting question, but it is problematical whether the fact situation will occur often enough to make the principle applicable in very many cases.

Changes in Procedure.-An accused person does not have a right to be tried in all respects in accordance with the law in force when the crime charged was committed. Laws shifting the place of trial from one county to another, increasing the number of appellate judges and dividing the appellate court into divisions, granting a right of appeal to the State, changing the method of selecting and summoning jurors,making separate trials for persons jointly indicted a matter of discretion for the trial court rather than a matter of right, and allowing a comparison of handwriting expertshave been sustained over the objection that they were ex post facto. It was said or suggested in a number of these cases, and two decisions were rendered precisely on the basis, that the mode of procedure might be changed only so long as the substantial rights of the accused were not curtailed. The Court has now disavowed this position. All that the language of most of these cases meant was that a legislature might not evade the ex post facto clause by labeling changes as alteration of "procedure." If a change labeled "procedural" effects a substantive change in the definition of a crime or increases punishment or denies a defense, the clause is invoked; however, if a law changes the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, the clause is not implicated, regardless of the increase in the burden on a defendant.

Changes in evidentiary rules that allow conviction on less evidence than was required at the time the crime was committed can also run afoul of the ex post facto clause. This principle was applied in the Court's invalidation of retroactive application of a Texas law that eliminated the requirement that the testimony of a sexual assault victim age 14 or older must be corroborated by two other witnesses, and allowed conviction on the victim's testimony alone.

Obligation of Contracts

"Law" Defined.-The term comprises statutes, constitutional provisions, municipal ordinances, and administrative regulations having the force and operation of statutes. But are judicial decisions within the clause? The abstract principle of the separation of powers, at least until recently, forbade the idea that the courts "make" law and the word "pass" in the above clause seemed to confine it to the formal and acknowledged methods of exercise of the law-making function. Accordingly, the Court has frequently said that the clause does not cover judicial decisions, however erroneous, or whatever their effect on existing contract rights. Nevertheless, there are important exceptions to this rule that are set forth below.

Status of Judicial Decisions.-While the highest state court usually has final authority in determining the construction as well as the validity of contracts entered into under the laws of the State, and the national courts will be bound by their decision of such matters, nevertheless, for reasons that are fairly obvious, this rule does not hold when the contract is one whose obligation is alleged to have been impaired by state law. Otherwise, the challenged state authority could be vindicated through the simple device of a modification or outright nullification by the state court of the contract rights in issue. Similarly, the highest state court usually has final authority in construing state statutes and determining their validity in relation to the state constitution. But this rule too has had to bend to some extent to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the obligation of contracts clause.

Suppose the following situation: (1) a municipality, acting under authority conferred by a state statute, has issued bonds in aid of a railway company; (2) the validity of this statute has been sustained by the highest state court; (3) later the state legislature passes an act to repeal certain taxes to meet the bonds; (4) it is sustained in doing so by a decision of the highest state court holding that the statute authorizing the bonds was unconstitutional ab initio. In such a case the Supreme Court would take an appeal from the state court and would reverse the latter's decision of un-constitutionality because of its effect in rendering operative the act to repeal the tax.

Suppose further, however, that the state court has reversed itself on the question of the constitutionality of the bonds in a suit by a creditor for payment without there having been an act of repeal. In this situation, the Supreme Court would still afford relief if the case is one between citizens of different States, which reaches it via a lower federal court. This is because in cases of this nature the Court formerly felt free to determine questions of fundamental justice for itself. Indeed, in such a case, the Court has apparently in the past regarded itself as free to pass upon the constitutionality of the state law authorizing the bonds even though there has been no prior decision by the highest state court sustaining them, the idea being that contracts entered into simply on the faith of the presumed constitutionality of a state statute are entitled to this protection.

In other words, in cases of which it has jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship, the Court has held that the obligation of contracts is capable of impairment by subsequent judicial decisions no less than by subsequent statutes and that it is able to prevent such impairment. In cases, on the other hand, of which it obtains jurisdiction only on the constitutional ground and by appeal from a state court, it has always adhered in terms to the doctrine that the word "laws" as used in Article I, § 10, does not comprehend judicial decisions. Yet even in these cases, it will intervene to protect contracts entered into on the faith of existing decisions from an impairment that is the direct result of a reversal of such decisions, but there must be in the offing, as it were, a statute of some kind- one possibly many years older than the contract rights involved- on which to pin its decision.

In 1922, Congress, through an amendment to the Judicial Code, endeavored to extend the reviewing power of the Supreme Court to suits involving ". . . the validity of a contract wherein it is claimed that a change in the rule of law or construction of statutes by the highest court of a State applicable to such contract would be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States... ." This appeared to be an invitation to the Court to say frankly that the obligation of a contract can be impaired by a subsequent court decision. The Court, however, declined the invitation in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft that reviewed many of the cases covered in the preceding paragraphs.

Dealing with Gelpcke and adherent decisions, Chief Justice Taft said: "These cases were not writs of error to the Supreme Court of a State. They were appeals or writs of error to federal courts where recovery was sought upon municipal or county bonds or some other form of contracts, the validity of which had been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of a State prior to their execution, and had been denied by the same court after their issue or making. In such cases the federal courts exercising jurisdiction between citizens of different States held themselves free to decide what the state law was, and to enforce it as laid down by the state Supreme Court before the contracts were made rather than in later decisions. They did not base this conclusion on Article I, § 10, of the Federal Constitution, but on the state law as they determined it, which, in diverse citizenship cases, under the third Article of the Federal Constitution they were empowered to do. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20 (1883)." While doubtless this was an available explanation in 1924, the decision in 1938 in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, so cut down the power of the federal courts to decide diversity of citizenship cases according to their own notions of "general principles of common law" as to raise the question whether the Court will not be required eventually to put Gelpcke and its companions and descendants squarely on the obligation of contracts clause or else abandon them.

"Obligation" Defined.-A contract is analyzable into two elements: the agreement, which comes from the parties, and the obligation, which comes from the law and makes the agreement binding on the parties. The concept of obligation is an importation from the Civil Law and its appearance in the contracts clause is supposed to have been due to James Wilson, a graduate of Scottish universities and a Civilian. Actually, the term as used in the contracts clause has been rendered more or less superfluous by the doctrine that the law in force when a contract is made enters into and comprises a part of the contract itself.Hence, the Court sometimes recognizes the term in its decisions applying the clause, sometimes ignores it. In Sturges v. Crowninshield, Marshall defined "obligation of contract" as "the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement;" but a little later the same year he set forth the points presented for consideration in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, to be: "1. Is this contract protected by the Constitution of the United States?

2. Is it impaired by the acts under which the defendant holds?" The word "obligation" undoubtedly does carry the implication that the Constitution was intended to protect only executory contracts-i.e., contracts still awaiting performance, but this implication was early rejected for a certain class of contracts, with immensely important result for the clause.

"Impair" Defined.-"The obligations of a contract," said Chief Justice Hughes for the Court in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, "are impaired by a law which renders them invalid, or releases or extinguishes them . . ., and impairment . . . has been predicated upon laws which without destroying contracts derogate from substantial contractual rights." But he adds: "Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile,-a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this Court." In short, the law from which the obligation stems must be understood to include constitutional law and, moreover a "progressive" constitutional law.

Vested Rights Not Included.-The term "contracts" is used in the contracts clause in its popular sense of an agreement of minds. The clause therefore does not protect vested rights that are not referable to such an agreement between the State and an individual, such as the right of recovery under a judgment. The individual in question may have a case under the Fourteenth Amendment, but not one under Article I, § 10.

Public Grants That Are Not "Contracts".-Not all grants by a State constitute "contracts" within the sense of Article I, § 10. In his Dartmouth College decision, Chief Justice Marshall conceded that "if the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it creates a civil institution, to be employed in the administration of the government . . . the subject is one in which the legislature of the State may act according to its own judgment," unrestrained by the Constitution -thereby drawing a line between "public" and "private" corporations that remained undisturbed for more than half a century.

It has been subsequently held many times that municipal corporations are mere instrumentalities of the State for the more convenient administration of local governments, whose powers may be enlarged, abridged, or entirely withdrawn at the pleasure of the legislature. The same principle applies, moreover, to the property rights which the municipality derives either directly or indirectly from the State. This was first held as to the grant of a franchise to a municipality to operate a ferry and has since then been recognized as the universal rule. It was stated in a case decided in 1923 that the distinction between the municipality as an agent of the State for governmental purposes and as an organization to care for local needs in a private or proprietary capacity, while it limited the legal liability of municipalities for the negligent acts or omissions of its officers or agents, did not, on the other hand, furnish ground for the application of constitutional restraints against the State in favor of its own municipalities. Thus, no contract rights were impaired by a statute relocating a county seat, even though the former location was by law to be "permanent" and the citizens of the community had donated land and furnished bonds for the erection of public buildings. Similarly, a statute changing the boundaries of a school district, giving to the new district the property within its limits that had belonged to the former district, and requiring the new district to assume the debts of the old district, did not impair the obligation of contracts. Nor was the contracts clause violated by state legislation authorizing state control over insolvent communities through a Municipal Finance Commission.

On the same ground of public agency, neither appointment nor election to public office creates a contract in the sense of Article I, § 10, whether as to tenure, or salary, or duties, all of which remain, so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned, subject to legislative modification or outright repeal. Indeed, there can be no such thing in this country as property in office, although the common law sustained a different view sometimes reflected in early cases. When, however, services have once been rendered, there arises an implied contract that they shall be compensated at the rate in force at the time they were rendered. Also, an express contract between the State and an individual for the performance of specific services falls within the protection of the Constitution. Thus, a contract made by the governor pursuant to a statute authorizing the appointment of a commissioner to conduct, over a period of years, a geological, mineralogical, and agricultural survey of the State, for which a definite sum had been authorized, was held to have been impaired by repeal of the statute. But a resolution of a local board of education reducing teachers' salaries for the school year 1933-1934, pursuant to an act of the legislature authorizing such action, was held not to impair the contract of a teacher who, having served three years, was by earlier legislation exempt from having his salary reduced except for inefficiency or misconduct. Similarly, it was held that an Illinois statute that reduced the annuity payable to retired teachers under an earlier act did not violate the contracts clause, since it had not been the intention of the earlier act to propose a contract but only to put into effect a general policy. On the other hand, the right of one, who had become a "permanent teacher" under the Indiana Teachers Tenure Act of 1927, to continued employment was held to be contractual and to have been impaired by the repeal in 1933 of the earlier act.

Tax Exemptions: When Not "Contracts".-From a different point of view, the Court has sought to distinguish between grants of privileges, whether to individuals or to corporations, which are contracts and those which are mere revocable licenses, although on account of the doctrine of presumed consideration mentioned earlier, this has not always been easy to do. In pursuance of the precedent set in New Jersey v. Wilson, the legislature of a State "may exempt particular parcels of property or the property of particular persons or corporations from taxation, either for a specified period or perpetually, or may limit the amount or rate of taxation, to which such property shall be subjected," and such an exemption is frequently a contract within the sense of the Constitution. Indeed this is always so when the immunity is conferred upon a corporation by the clear terms of its charter. When, on the other hand, an immunity of this sort springs from general law, its precise nature is more open to doubt, as a comparison of decisions will serve to illustrate.

In State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, a closely divided Court held that a general banking law of Ohio, which provided that companies complying therewith and their stockholders should be exempt from all but certain taxes, was, as to a bank organized under it and its stockholders, a contract within the meaning of Article I, § 10. The provision was not, the Court said, "a legislative command nor a rule of taxation until changed, but a contract stipulating against any change, from the nature of the language used and the circumstances under which it was adopted." When, however, the State of Michigan pledged itself, by a general legislative act, not to tax any corporation, company, or individual undertaking to manufacture salt in the State from water there obtained by boring on property used for this purpose and, furthermore, to pay a bounty on the salt so manufactured, it was held not to have engaged itself within the constitutional sense. "General encouragements," said the Court, "held out to all persons indiscriminately, to engage in a particular trade or manufacture, whether such encouragement be in the shape of bounties or drawbacks, or other advantage, are always under the legislative control, and may be discontinued at any time." So far as exemption from taxation is concerned the difference between these two cases is obviously slight, but the later one is unquestionable authority for the proposition that legislative bounties are repealable at will.

Furthermore, exemptions from taxation have in certain cases been treated as gratuities repealable at will, even when conferred by specific legislative enactments. This would seem always to be the case when the beneficiaries were already in existence when the exemption was created and did nothing of a more positive nature to qualify for it than to continue in existence. Yet the cases are not always easy to explain in relation to each other, except in light of the fact that the Court's point of view has altered from time to time.

"Contracts" Include Public Contracts and Corporate Charters.-The question, which was settled very early, was whether the clause was intended to be applied solely in protection of private contracts or in the protection also of public grants, or, more broadly, in protection of public contracts, in short, those to which a State is a party. Support for the affirmative answer accorded this question could be derived from the following sources. For one thing, the clause departed from the comparable provision in the Northwest Ordinance (1787) in two respects: first, in the presence of the word "obligation;" secondly, in the absence of the word "private." There is good reason for believing that James Wilson may have been responsible for both alterations, inasmuch as two years earlier he had denounced a current proposal to repeal the Bank of North America's Pennsylvania charter in the following words: "If the act for incorporating the subscribers to the Bank of North America shall be repealed in this manner, every precedent will be established for repealing, in the same manner, every other legislative charter in Pennsylvania. A pretence, as specious as any that can be alleged on this occasion, will never be wanting on any future occasion. Those acts of the state, which have hitherto been considered as the sure anchors of privilege and of property, will become the sport of every varying gust of politicks, and will float wildly backwards and forwards on the irregular and impetuous tides of party and faction."

Furthermore, in its first important constitutional case, that of Chisholm v. Georgia, the Court ruled that its original jurisdiction extended to an action in assumpsit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State of Georgia. This construction of the federal judicial power was, to be sure, promptly repealed by the Eleventh Amendment, but without affecting the implication that the contracts protected by the Constitution included public contracts.

One important source of this diversity of opinion is to be found in that ever welling spring of constitutional doctrine in early days, the prevalence of natural law notions and the resulting vague significance of the term "law." In Sturges v. Crowninshield, Marshall defined the obligation of contracts as "the law which binds the parties to perform their undertaking." Whence, however, comes this law? If it comes from the State alone, which Marshall was later to deny even as to private contracts, then it is hardly possible to hold that the States' own contracts are covered by the clause, which manifestly does not create an obligation for contracts but only protects such obligation as already exists. But, if, on the other hand, the law furnishing the obligation of contracts comprises Natural Law and kindred principles, as well as law which springs from state authority, then, inasmuch as the State itself is presumably bound by such principles, the State's own obligations, so far as harmonious with them, are covered by the clause.

Fletcher v. Peck has the double claim to fame that it was the first case in which the Supreme Court held a state enactment to be in conflict with the Constitution, and also the first case to hold that the contracts clause protected public grants. By an act passed on January 7, 1795, the Georgia Legislature directed the sale to four land companies of public lands comprising most of what are now the States of Alabama and Mississippi. As soon became known, the passage of the measure had been secured by open and wholesale bribery. So when a new legislature took over in the winter of 1795-1796, almost its first act was to revoke the sale made the previous year.

Meantime, however, the land companies had disposed of several millions of acres of their holdings to speculators and prospective settlers, and following the rescinding act some of these took counsel with Alexander Hamilton as to their rights. In an opinion which was undoubtedly known to the Court when it decided Fletcher v. Peck, Hamilton characterized the repeal as contravening "the first principles of natural justice and social policy," especially so far as it was made "to the prejudice . . . of third persons . . . innocent of the alleged fraud or corruption; . . . moreover," he added, "the Constitution of the United States, article first, section tenth, declares that no State shall pass a law impairing the obligations of contract. This must be equivalent to saying no State shall pass a law revoking, invalidating, or altering a contract. Every grant from one to another, whether the grantor be a State or an individual, is virtually a contract that the grantee shall hold and enjoy the thing granted against the grantor, and his representatives. It, therefore, appears to me that taking the terms of the Constitution in their large sense, and giving them effect according to the general spirit and policy of the provisions, the revocation of the grant by the act of the legislature of Georgia may justly be considered as contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and, therefore null. And that the courts of the United States, in cases within their jurisdiction, will be likely to pronounce it so." In the debate to which the "Yazoo Land Frauds," as they were contemporaneously known, gave rise in Congress, Hamilton's views were quoted frequently.

So far as it invoked the obligation of contracts clause, Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck performed two creative acts. He recognized that an obligatory contract was one still to be performed-in other words, was an executory contract, also that a grant of land was an executed contract-a conveyance. But, he asserted, every grant is attended by "an implied contract" on the part of the grantor not to claim again the thing granted. Thus, grants are brought within the category of contracts having continuing obligation and so within Article I, § 10. But the question still remained of the nature of this obligation. Marshall's answer to this can only be inferred from his statement at the end of his opinion. The State of Georgia, he says, "was restrained" from the passing of the rescinding act "either by general principles which are common to our free institutions, or by particular provisions of the Constitution of the United States."

The protection thus thrown about land grants was presently extended, in the case of New Jersey v. Wilson, to a grant of immunity from taxation that the State of New Jersey had accorded certain Indian lands, and several years after that, in the Dartmouth College case, to the charter privileges of an eleemosy-nary corporation.

In City of El Paso v. Simmons, the Court held, over a vigorous dissent by Justice Black, that Texas had not violated this clause when it amended its laws governing the sale of public lands so as to restrict the previously unlimited right of a delinquent to reinstate himself upon forfeited land by a single payment of all past interest due.

Corporate Charters: Different Ways of Regarding.-There are three ways in which the charter of a corporation may be regarded. In the first place, it may be thought of simply as a license terminable at will by the State, like a liquor-seller's license or an auctioneer's license, but affording the incorporators, so long as it remains in force, the privileges and advantages of doing business in the form of a corporation. Nowadays, indeed, when corporate charters are usually issued to all legally qualified applicants by an administrative officer who acts under a general statute, this would probably seem to be the natural way of regarding them were it not for the Dartmouth College decision. But, in 1819 charters were granted directly by the state legislatures in the form of special acts and there were very few profit-taking corporations in the country. The later extension of the benefits of the Dartmouth College decision to corporations organized under general law took place without discussion.

Secondly, a corporate charter may be regarded as a franchise constituting a vested or property interest in the hands of the holders, and therefore as forfeitable only for abuse or in accordance with its own terms. This is the way in which some of the early state courts did regard them at the outset. It is also the way in which Blackstone regarded them in relation to the royal prerogative, although not in relation to the sovereignty of Parliament, and the same point of view found expression in Story's concurring opinion in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, as it did also in Webster's argument in that case.

The third view is the one formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in his controlling opinion in Dartmouth College v. Woodward. This is that the charter of Dartmouth College, a purely private institution, was the outcome and partial record of a contract between the donors of the college, on the one hand, and the British Crown, on the other, and the contract still continued in force between the State of New Hampshire, as the successor to the Crown and Government of Great Britain, and the trustees, as successors to the donors. The charter, in other words, was not simply a grant-rather it was the documentary record of a still existent agreement between still existent parties. Taking this view, which he developed with great ingenuity and persuasiveness, Marshall was able to appeal to the obligation of contracts clause directly, and without further use of his fiction in Fletcher v. Peck of an executory contract accompanying the grant.

A difficulty still remained, however, in the requirement that a contract, before it can have obligation, must import consideration, that is to say, must be shown not to have been entirely gratuitous on either side. Moreover, the consideration, which induced the Crown to grant a charter to Dartmouth College, was not merely a speculative one. It consisted of the donations of the donors to the important public interest of education. Fortunately or unfortunately, in dealing with this phase of the case, Marshall used more sweeping terms than were needed. "The objects for which a corporation is created," he wrote, "are universally such as the government wishes to promote. They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and in most cases, the sole consideration of the grant." In other words, the simple fact of the charter having been granted imports consideration from the point of view of the State. With this doctrine before it, the Court in Providence Bank v. Billings, and again in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, admitted without discussion of the point, the applicability of the Dartmouth College decision to purely business concerns.

Reservation of Right to Alter or Repeal Corporate Charters.-It is next in order to consider four principles or doctrines whereby the Court has itself broken down the force of the Dartmouth College decision in great measure in favor of state legislative power. By the logic of the Dartmouth College decision itself, the State may reserve in a corporate charter the right to "amend, alter, and repeal" the same, and such reservation becomes a part of the contract between the State and the incorporators, the obligation of which is accordingly not impaired by the exercise of the right. Later decisions recognize that the State may reserve the right to amend, alter, and repeal by general law, with the result of incorporating the reservation in all charters of subsequent date. There is, however, a difference between a reservation by a statute and one by constitutional provision. While the former may be repealed as to a subsequent charter by the specific terms thereof, the latter may not.

Is the right reserved by a State to "amend" or "alter" a charter without restriction? When it is accompanied, as it generally is, by the right to "repeal," one would suppose that the answer to this question was self-evident. Nonetheless, there are a number of judicial dicta to the effect that this power is not without limit, that it must be exercised reasonably and in good faith, and that the alterations made must be consistent with the scope and object of the grant. Such utterances amount, apparently, to little more than an anchor to windward, for while some of the state courts have applied tests of this nature to the disallowance of legislation, it does not appear that the Supreme Court of the United States has ever done so.

Quite different is it with the distinction pointed out in the cases between the franchises and privileges that a corporation derives from its charter and the rights of property and contract that accrue to it in the course of its existence. Even the outright repeal of the former does not wipe out the latter or cause them to escheat to the State. The primary heirs of the defunct organization are its creditors, but whatever of value remains after their valid claims are met goes to the former shareholders. By the earlier weight of authority, on the other hand, persons who contract with companies whose charters are subject to legislative amendment or repeal do so at their own risk; any "such contracts made between individuals and the corporation do not vary or in any manner change or modify the relation between the State and the corporation in respect to the right of the State to alter, modify, or amend such a charter...." But later holdings becloud this rule.

Corporation Subject to the Law and Police Power.-But suppose the State neglects to reserve the right to amend, alter, or repeal. Is it, then, without power to control its corporate creatures? By no means. Private corporations, like other private persons, are always presumed to be subject to the legislative power of the State, from which it follows that immunities conferred by charter are to be treated as exceptions to an otherwise controlling rule. This principle was recognized by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Providence Bank v. Billings, in which he held that in the absence of express stipulation or reasonable implication to the contrary in its charter, the bank was subject to the taxing power of the State, notwithstanding that the power to tax is the power to destroy.

And of course the same principle is equally applicable to the exercise by the State of its police powers. Thus, in what was perhaps the leading case before the Civil War, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the legislature of that State had the right, in furtherance of the public safety, to require chartered companies operating railways to fence in their tracks and provide cattle guards. In a matter of this nature, said the court, corporations are on a level with individuals engaged in the same business, unless, from their charter, they can prove the contrary. Since then the rule has been applied many times in justification of state regulation of railroads, and even of the application of a state prohibition law to a company that had been chartered expressly to manufacture beer.

Strict Construction of Charters, Tax Exemptions.-Long, however, before the cases last cited were decided, the principle that they illustrate had come to be powerfully reinforced by two others, the first of which is that all charter privileges and immunities are to be strictly construed as against the claims of the State, or as it is otherwise often phrased, "nothing passes by implication in a public grant."

The leading case was that of the Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, which was decided shortly after Chief Justice Marshall's death by a substantially new Court. The question at issue was whether the charter of the complaining company, which authorized it to operate a toll bridge, stood in the way of the State's permitting another company of later date to operate a free bridge in the immediate vicinity. Inasmuch as the first company could point to no clause in its charter specifically vesting it with an exclusive right, the Court held the charter of the second company to be valid on the principle just stated. Justice Story, presented a vigorous dissent, in which he argued cogently, but unavailingly, that the monopoly claimed by the Charles River Bridge Company was fully as reasonable an implication from the terms of its charter and the circumstances surrounding its concession as perpetuity had been from the terms of the Dartmouth College charter and the ensuing transaction.

The Court was in fact making new law, because it was looking at things from a new point of view. This was the period when judicial recognition of the Police Power began to take on a doctrinal character. It was also the period when the railroad business was just beginning.

Chief Justice Taney's opinion evinces the influence of both these developments. The power of the State to provide for its own internal happiness and prosperity was not, he asserted, to be pared away by mere legal intendments, nor was its ability to avail itself of the lights of modern science to be frustrated by obsolete interests such as those of the old turnpike companies, the charter privileges of which, he apprehended, might easily become a bar to the development of transportation along new lines.

The rule of strict construction has been reiterated by the Court many times. In the Court's opinion in Blair v. City of Chicago, decided nearly seventy years after the Charles River Bridge case, it said: "Legislative grants of this character should be in such unequivocal form of expression that the legislative mind may be distinctly impressed with their character and import, in order that the privilege may be intelligently granted or purposely withheld. It is a matter of common knowledge that grants of this character are usually prepared by those interested in them, and submitted to the legislature with a view to obtain from such bodies the most liberal grant of privileges which they are willing to give. This is one among many reasons why they are to be strictly construed.... The principle is this, that all rights which are asserted against the State must be clearly defined, and not raised by inference or presumption; and if the charter is silent about a power, it does not exist. If, on a fair reading of the instrument, reasonable doubts arise as to the proper interpretation to be given to it, those doubts are to be solved in favor of the State; and where it is susceptible of two meanings, the one restricting and the other extending the powers of the corporation, that construction is to be adopted which works the least harm to the State.'"

An excellent illustration of the operation of the rule in relation to tax exemptions was furnished by the derivative doctrine that an immunity of this character must be deemed as intended solely for the benefit of the corporation receiving it and hence, in the absence of express permission by the State, may not be passed on to a successor. Thus, where two companies, each exempt from taxation, were permitted by the legislature to consolidate, the new corporation was held to be subject to taxation. Again, a statute which granted a corporation all "the rights and privileges" of an earlier corporation was held not to confer the latter's "immunity" from taxation. Yet again, a legislative authorization of the transfer by one corporation to another of the former's "estate, property, right, privileges, and franchises" was held not to clothe the later company with the earlier one's exemption from taxation.

Furthermore, an exemption from taxation is to be strictly construed even in the hands of one clearly entitled to it. So the exemption conferred by its charter on a railway company was held not to extend to branch roads constructed by it under a later statute. Also, a general exemption of the property of a corporation from taxation was held to refer only to the property actually employed in its business. Also, the charter exemption of the capital stock of a railroad from taxation "for ten years after completion of the said road" was held not to become operative until the completion of the road. So also the exemption of the campus and endowment fund of a college was held to leave other lands of the college, though a part of its endowment, subject to taxation. Provisions in a statute that bonds of the State and its political subdivisions were not to be taxed and should not be taxed were held not to exempt interest on them from taxation as income of the owners.

Strict Construction and the Police Power.-The police power, too, has frequently benefitted from the doctrine of strict construction, although this recourse is today seldom, if ever, necessary in this connection. Some of the more striking cases may be briefly summarized. The provision in the charter of a railway company permitting it to set reasonable charges still left the legislature free to determine what charges were reasonable. On the other hand, when a railway agreed to accept certain rates for a specified period, it thereby foreclosed the question of the reasonableness of such rates.The grant to a company of the right to supply a city with water for twenty-five years was held not to prevent a similar concession to another company by the same city. The promise by a city in the charter of a water company not to make a similar grant to any other person or corporation was held not to prevent the city itself from engaging in the business. A municipal concession to a water company to run for thirty years, and accompanied by the provision that the "said company shall charge the following rates," was held not to prevent the city from reducing such rates. But more broadly, the grant to a municipality of the power to regulate the charges of public service companies was held not to bestow the right to contract away this power. Indeed, any claim by a private corporation that it received the rate-making power from a municipality must survive a two fold challenge: first, as to the right of the municipality under its charter to make such a grant, secondly, as to whether it has actually done so, and in both respects an affirmative answer must be based on express words and not on implication.

Doctrine of Inalienability as Applied to Eminent Domain, Taxing, and Police Powers.- The second of the doctrines mentioned above, whereby the principle of the subordination of all persons, corporate and individual alike, to the legislative power of the State has been fortified, is the doctrine that certain of the State's powers are inalienable, and that any attempt by a State to alienate them, upon any consideration whatsoever, is ipso facto void and hence incapable to producing a "contract" within the meaning of Article I, § 10. One of the earliest cases to assert this principle occurred in New York in 1826. The corporation of the City of New York, having conveyed certain lands for the purposes of a church and cemetery together with a covenant for quiet enjoyment, later passed a by-law forbidding their use as a cemetery. In denying an action against the city for breach of covenant, the state court said the defendants "had no power as a party, [to the covenant] to make a contract which should control or embarrass their legislative powers and duties."

The Supreme Court first applied similar doctrine in 1848 in a case involving a grant of exclusive right to construct a bridge at a specified locality. Sustaining the right of the State of Vermont to make a new grant to a competing company, the Court held that the obligation of the earlier exclusive grant was sufficiently recognized in making just compensation for it; and that corporate franchises, like all other forms of property, are subject to the overruling power of eminent domain. This reasoning was reinforced by an appeal to the theory of state sovereignty, which was held to involve the corollary of the inalienability of all the principal powers of a State.

The subordination of all charter rights and privileges to the power of eminent domain has been maintained by the Court ever since; not even an explicit agreement by the State to forego the exercise of the power will avail against it. Conversely, the State may revoke an improvident grant of public property without recourse to the power of eminent domain, such a grant being inherently beyond the power of the State to make. So when the legislature of Illinois in 1869 devised to the Illinois Central Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, the State's right and title to nearly a thousand acres of submerged land under Lake Michigan along the harbor front of Chicago, and four years later sought to repeal the grant, the Court, a four-to-three decision, sustained an action by the State to recover the lands in question. Said Justice Field, speaking for the majority: "Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of public. The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property.... Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which the property was held by the State can be resumed at any time."

On the other hand, repeated endeavors to subject tax exemptions to the doctrine of inalienability, though at times supported by powerful minorities on the Bench, have failed. As recently as January, 1952, the Court ruled that the Georgia Railway Company was entitled to seek an injunction in the federal courts against an attempt by Georgia's Revenue Commission to compel it to pay ad valorem taxes contrary to the terms of its special charter issued in 1833. In answer to the argument that this was a suit contrary to the Eleventh Amendment, the Court declared that the immunity from federal jurisdiction created by the Amendment "does not extend to individuals who act as officers without çconstitutional authority."

The leading case involving the police power is Stone v. Mississippi. In 1867, the legislature of Mississippi chartered a company to which it expressly granted the power to conduct a lottery. Two years later, the State adopted a new Constitution which contained a provision forbidding lotteries, and a year later the legislature passed an act to put this provision into effect. In upholding this act and the constitutional provision on which it was based, the Court said: "The power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be granted away. The people, in their sovereign capacity, have established their agencies for the preservation of the public health and the public morals, and the protection of public and private rights," and these agencies can neither give away nor sell their discretion. All that one can get by a charter permitting the business of conducting a lottery "is suspension of certain governmental rights in his favor, subject to withdrawal at will."

The Court shortly afterward applied the same reasoning in a case in which was challenged the right of Louisiana to invade the exclusive privilege of a corporation engaged in the slaughter of cattle in New Orleans by granting another company the right to engage in the same business. Although the State did not offer to compensate the older company for the lost monopoly, its action was sustained on the ground that it had been taken in the interest of the public health. When, however, the City of New Orleans, in reliance on this precedent, sought to repeal an exclusive franchise which it had granted a company for fifty years to supply gas to its inhabitants, the Court interposed its veto, explaining that in this instance neither the public health, the public morals, nor the public safety was involved.

Later decisions, nonetheless, apply the principle of inalienability broadly. To quote from one: "It is settled that neither the 'contract' clause nor the 'due process' clause has the effect of overriding the power to the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and all contract and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise."

Private Contracts.-The term "private contract" is, naturally, not all-inclusive. A judgment, though granted in favor of a creditor, is not a contract in the sense of the Constitution, nor is marriage. And whether a particular agreement is a valid contract is a question for the courts, and finally for the Supreme Court, when the protection of the contract clause is invoked.

The question of the nature and source of the obligation of a contract, which went by default in Fletcher v. Peck and the Dartmouth College case, with such vastly important consequences, had eventually to be met and answered by the Court in connection with private contracts. The first case involving such a contract to reach the Supreme Court was Sturges v. Crowninshield, in which a debtor sought escape behind a state insolvency act of later date than his note. The act was held inoperative, but whether this was because of its retroactivity in this particular case or for the broader reason that it assumed to excuse debtors from their promises was not at the time made clear. As noted earlier, Chief Justice Marshall's definition on this occasion of the obligation of a contract as the law which binds the parties to perform their undertakings was not free from ambiguity, owing to the uncertain connotation of the term law.

These obscurities were finally cleared up for most cases in Ogden v. Saunders, in which the temporal relation of the statute and the contract involved was exactly reversed-the former antedating the latter. Marshall contended, but unsuccessfully, that the statute was void, inasmuch as it purported to release the debtor from that original, intrinsic obligation which always attaches under natural law to the acts of free agents. "When," he wrote, "we advert to the course of reading generally pursued by American statesmen in early life, we must suppose that the framers of our Constitution were intimately acquainted with the writings of those wise and learned men whose treatises on the laws of nature and nations have guided public opinion on the subjects of obligation and contracts," and that they took their views on these subjects from those sources. He also posed the question of what would happen to the obligation of contracts clause if States might pass acts declaring that all contracts made subsequently thereto should be subject to legislative control.

For the first and only time, a majority of the Court abandoned the Chief Justice's leadership. Speaking by Justice Washington, it held that the obligation of private contracts is derived from the municipal law-state statutes and judicial decisions-and that the inhibition of Article I, § 10, is confined to legislative acts made after the contracts affected by them, subject to the following exception. By a curiously complicated line of reasoning, it was also held in the same case that when the creditor is a nonresident, then a State by an insolvency law may not alter the former's rights under a contract, albeit one of later date.

With the proposition established that the obligation of a private contract comes from the municipal law in existence when the contract is made, a further question presents itself, namely, what part of the municipal law is referred to? No doubt, the law which determines the validity of the contract itself is a part of such law. Also part of such law is the law which interprets the terms used in the contract, or which supplies certain terms when others are used, as for instance, constitutional provisions or statutes which determine what is "legal tender" for the payment of debts, or judicial decisions which construe the term "for value received" as used in a promissory note, and so on. In short, any law which at the time of the making of a contract goes to measure the rights and duties of the parties to it in relation to each other enters into its obligation.

Remedy a Part of the Private Obligation.-Suppose, however, that one of the parties to a contract fails to live up to his obligation as thus determined. The contract itself may now be regarded as at an end, but the injured party, nevertheless, has a new set of rights in its stead, those which are furnished him by the remedial law, including the law of procedure. In the case of a mortgage, he may foreclose; in the case of a promissory note, he may sue; and in certain cases, he may demand specific performance. Hence the further question arises, whether this remedial law is to be considered a part of the law supplying the obligation of contracts. Originally, the predominating opinion was negative, since as we have just seen, this law does not really come into operation until the contract has been broken. Yet it is obvious that the sanction which this law lends to contracts is extremely important-indeed, indispensable. In due course it became the accepted doctrine that that part of the law which supplies one party to a contract with a remedy if the other party does not live up to his agreement, as authoritatively interpreted, entered into the "obligation of contracts" in the constitutional sense of this term, and so might not be altered to the material weakening of existing contracts. In the Court's own words: "Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of enforcement. Without the remedy the contract may, indeed, in the sense of the law, be said not to exist, and its obligation to fall within the class of those moral and social duties which depend for their fulfillment wholly upon the will of the individual. The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable . . ."

This rule was first definitely announced in 1843 in the case of Bronson v. Kinzie. Here, an Illinois mortgage giving the mortgagee an unrestricted power of sale in case of the mortgagor's default was involved, along with a later act of the legislature that required mortgaged premises to be sold for not less than two-thirds of the appraised value and allowed the mortgagor a year after the sale to redeem them. It was held that the statute, in altering the preexisting remedies to such an extent, violated the constitutional prohibition and hence was void. The year following a like ruling was made in the case of McCracken v. Hayward, as to a statutory provision that personal property should not be sold under execution for less than two-thirds of its appraised value.

But the rule illustrated by these cases does not signify that a State may make no changes in its remedial or procedural law that affect existing contracts. "Provided," the Court has said, "a substantial or efficacious remedy remains or is given, by means of which a party can enforce his rights under the contract, the Legislature may modify or change existing remedies or prescribe new modes of procedure." Thus, States are constantly remodelling their judicial systems and modes of practice unembarrassed by the obligation of contracts clause. The right of a State to abolish imprisonment for debt was early asserted. Again, the right of a State to shorten the time for the bringing of actions has been affirmed even as to existing causes of action, but with the proviso added that a reasonable time must be left for the bringing of such actions. On the other hand, a statute which withdrew the judicial power to enforce satisfaction of a certain class of judgments by mandamus was held invalid. In the words of the Court: "Every case must be determined upon its own circumstances;" and it later added: "In all such cases the question becomes . . . one of reasonableness, and of that the legislature is primarily the judge."

There is one class of cases resulting from the doctrine that the law of remedy constitutes a part of the obligation of a contract to which a special word is due. This comprises cases in which the contracts involved were municipal bonds. While a city is from one point of view but an emanation from the government's sovereignty and an agent thereof, when it borrows money it is held to be acting in a corporate or private capacity and so to be suable on its contracts. Furthermore, as was held in the leading case of United States ex rel. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, "where a State has authorized a municipal corporation to contract and to exercise the power of local taxation to the extent necessary to meet its engagements, the power thus given cannot be withdrawn until the contract is satisfied." In this case the Court issued a mandamus compelling the city officials to levy taxes for the satisfaction of a judgment on its bonds in accordance with the law as it stood when the bonds were issued. Nor may a State by dividing an indebted municipality among others enable it to escape its obligations. The debt follows the territory and the duty of assessing and collecting taxes to satisfy it devolves upon the succeeding corporations and their officers. But where a municipal organization has ceased practically to exist through the vacation of its offices, and the government's function is exercised once more by the State directly, the Court has thus far found itself powerless to frustrate a program of repudiation. However, there is no reason why the State should enact the role of particeps criminis in an attempt to relieve its municipalities of the obligation to meet their honest debts. Thus, in 1931, during the Great Depression, New Jersey created a Municipal Finance Commission with power to assume control over its insolvent municipalities. To the complaint of certain bondholders that this legislation impaired the contract obligations of their debtors, the Court, speaking by Justice Frankfurter, pointed out that the practical value of an unsecured claim against a city is "the effectiveness of the city's taxing power," which the legislation under review was designed to conserve.

Private Contracts and the Police Power.-The increasing subjection of public grants to the police power of the States has been previously pointed out. That purely private contracts should be in any stronger situation in this respect obviously would be anomalous in the extreme. In point of fact, the ability of private parties to curtail governmental authority by the easy device of contracting with one another is, with an exception to be noted, even less than that of the State to tie its own hands by contracting away its own powers. So, when it was contended in an early Pennsylvania case that an act prohibiting the issuance of notes by unincorporated banking associations was violative of the obligation of contracts clause because of its effect upon certain existing contracts of members of such association, the state Supreme Court answered: "But it is said, that the members had formed a contract between themselves, which would be dissolved by the stoppage of their business. And what then? Is that such a violation of contracts as is prohibited by the Constitution of the United States? Consider to what such a construction would lead. Let us suppose, that in one of the States there is no law against gaming, cock-fighting, horse-racing or public masquerades, and that companies should be formed for the purpose of carrying on these practices... ."

Would the legislature then be powerless to prohibit them? The answer returned, of course, was no.

The prevailing doctrine was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the following words: "It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected.... In other words, that parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good."

So, in an early case, we find a state recording act upheld as applying to deeds dated before the passage of the act. Later cases have brought the police power in its more customary phases into contact with private as well as with public contracts. Lottery tickets, valid when issued, were necessarily invalidated by legislation prohibiting the lottery business;contracts for the sale of beer, valid when entered into, were similarly nullified by a state prohibition law; and contracts of employment were modified by later laws regarding the liability of employers and workmen's compensation. Likewise, a contract between plaintiff and defendant did not prevent the State from making the latter a concession which rendered the contract worthless; nor did a contract as to rates between two railway companies prevent the State from imposing different rates; nor did a contract between a public utility company and a customer protect the rates agreed upon from being superseded by those fixed by the State. Similarly, a contract for the conveyance of water beyond the limits of a State did not prevent the State from prohibiting such conveyance.

But the most striking exertions of the police power touching private contracts, as well as other private interests within recent years, have been evoked by war and economic depression. Thus, in World War I, the State of New York enacted a statute which, declaring that a public emergency existed, forbade the enforcement of covenants for the surrender of the possession of premises on the expiration of leases, and wholly deprived for a period owners of dwellings, including apartment and tenement houses, within the City of New York and contiguous counties, of possessory remedies for the eviction from their premises of tenants in possession when the law took effect, providing the latter were able and willing to pay a reasonable rent. In answer to objections leveled against this legislation on the basis of the obligation of contracts clause, the Court said: "But contracts are made subject to this exercise of the power of the State when otherwise justified, as we have held this to be."In a subsequent case, however, the Court added that, while the declaration by the legislature of a justifying emergency was entitled to great respect, it was not conclusive; a law "depending upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change," and whether they have changed was always open to judicial inquiry.

Summing up the result of the cases above referred to, Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, remarked in 1934: "It is manifest from this review of our decisions that there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare. The settlement and consequent contraction of the public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing density of population, the interrelation of the activities of our people and the complexity of our economic interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of the organization of society in order to protect the very bases of individual opportunity. Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only the concerns of individuals or of classes were involved, and that those of the State itself were touched only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental interests of the State are directly affected; and that the question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all depends.... The principle of this development is . . . that the reservation of the reasonable exercise of the protective power of the States is read into all contracts . . ."

Evaluation of the Clause Today.-It should not be inferred that the obligation of contracts clause is today totally moribund. Even prior to the most recent decisions, it still furnished the basis for some degree of judicial review as to the substantiality of the factual justification of a professed exercise by a state legislature of its police power, and in the case of legislation affecting the remedial rights of creditors, it still affords a solid and palpable barrier against legislative erosion. Nor is this surprising in view of the fact that, as we have seen, such rights were foremost in the minds of the framers of the clause. The Court's attitude toward insolvency laws, redemption laws, exemption laws, appraisement laws and the like, has always been that they may not be given retroactive operation, and the general lesson of these earlier cases is confirmed by the Court's decisions between 1934 and 1945 in certain cases involving state moratorium statutes. In Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, the leading case, a closely divided Court sustained the Minnesota Moratorium Act of April 18, 1933, which, reciting the existence of a severe financial and economic depression for several years and the frequent occurrence of mortgage foreclosure sales for inadequate prices, and asserting that these conditions had created an economic emergency calling for the exercise of the State's police power, authorized its courts to extend the period for redemption from foreclosure sales for such additional time as they might deem just and equitable, although in no event beyond May 1, 1935.

The act also left the mortgagor in possession during the period of extension, subject to the requirement that he pay a reasonable rental for the property as fixed by the court. Contemporaneously, however, less carefully drawn statutes from Missouri and Arkansas, acts which were not as considerate of creditor's rights, were set aside as violative of the contracts clause. "A State is free to regulate the procedure in its courts even with reference to contracts already made," said Justice Cardozo for the Court, "and moderate extensions of the time for pleading or for trial will ordinarily fall within the power so reserved. A different situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a shadow.... What controls our judgment at such times is the underlying reality rather than the form or label. The changes of remedy now challenged as invalid are to be viewed in combination, with the cumulative significance that each imparts to all. So viewed they are seen to be an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly all the incidents that give attractiveness and value to collateral security." On the other hand, in the most recent of this category of cases, the Court gave its approval to an extension by the State of New York of its moratorium legislation. While recognizing that business conditions had improved, the Court was of the opinion that there was reason to believe that "'the sudden termination of the legislation which has dammed up normal liquidation of these mortgages for more than eight years might well result in an emergency more acute than that which the original legislation was intended to alleviate.'"

And meantime the Court had sustained legislation of the State of New York under which a mortgagee of real property was denied a deficiency judgment in a foreclosure suit where the state court found that the value of the property purchased by the mortgagee at the foreclosure sale was equal to the debt secured by the mortgage. "Mortgagees," the Court said, "are constitutionally entitled to no more than payment in full.... To hold that mortgagees are entitled under the contract clause to retain the advantages of a forced sale would be to dignify into a constitutionally protected property right their chance to get more than the amount of their contracts.... The contract clause does not protect such a strategical, procedural advantage."

More important, the Court has been at pains most recently to reassert the vitality of the clause, although one may wonder whether application of the clause will be more than episodic.

"[T]he Contract Clause remains a part of our written Constitution." So saying, the Court struck down state legislation in two instances, one law involving the government's own contractual obligation and the other affecting private contracts. A finding that a contract has been "impaired" in some way is merely the preliminary step in evaluating the validity of the state action. But in both cases the Court applied a stricter-than-usual scrutiny to the statutory action, in the public contracts case precisely because it was its own obligation that the State was attempting to avoid and in the private contract case, apparently, because the legislation was in aid of a "narrow class." The approach in any event is one of balancing. "The severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear. Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the other hand, will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the state legislation." Having determined that a severe impairment had resulted in both cases, the Court moved on to assess the justification for the state action. In United States Trust, the test utilized by the Court was that an impairment would be upheld only if it were "necessary" and "reasonable" to serve an important public purpose. But the two terms were given somewhat restrictive meanings. Necessity is shown only when the State's objectives could not have been achieved through less dramatic modifications of the contract; reasonableness is a function of the extent to which alteration of the contract was prompted by circumstances unforeseen at the time of its formation. The repeal of the covenant in issue was found to fail both prongs of the test. In Spannaus, the Court drew from its prior cases four standards: did the law deal with a broad generalized economic or social problem, did it operate in an area already subject to state regulation at the time the contractual obligations were entered into, did it effect simply a temporary alteration of the contractual relationship, and did the law operate upon a broad class of affected individuals or concerns. The Court found that the challenged law did not possess any of these attributes and thus struck it down.

Whether these two cases portend an active judicial review of economic regulatory activities, in contrast to the extreme deference shown such legislation under the due process and equal protection clauses, is problematical. Both cases contain language emphasizing the breadth of the police powers of government that may be used to further the public interest and admitting limited judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, "[i]f the Contract Clause is to retain any meaning at all . . . it must be understood to impose some limits upon the power of a State to abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of its otherwise legitimate police power."

Clause 2. Duties on Exports and Imports

Clause 2. No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.

Duties on Exports or Imports

Scope

Only articles imported from or exported to a foreign country, or "a place over which the Constitution has not extended its commands with respect to imports and their taxation," are comprehended by the terms "imports" and "exports." With respect to exports, the exemption from taxation "attaches to the export and not to the article before its exportation," requiring an essentially factual inquiry into whether there have been acts of movement toward a final destination constituting sufficient entrance into the export stream as to invoke the protection of the clause. To determine how long imported wares remain under the protection of this clause, the Supreme Court enunciated the original package doctrine in the leading case of Brown v. Maryland. "When the importer has so acted upon the thing imported," wrote Chief Justice Marshall, "that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the State; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports, to escape the prohibition in the Constitution." A box, case, or bale in which separate parcels of goods have been placed by the foreign seller is regarded as the original package, and upon the opening of such container for the purpose of using the separate parcels, or of exposing them for sale, each loses its character as an import and becomes subject to taxation as a part of the general mass of property in the State. Imports for manufacture cease to be such when the intended processing takes place, or when the original packages are broken. Where a manufacturer imports merchandise and stores it in his warehouse in the original packages, that merchandise does not lose its quality as an import, at least so long as it is not required to meet such immediate needs. The purchaser of imported goods is deemed to be the importer if he was the efficient cause of the importation, whether the title to the goods vested in him at the time of shipment, or after its arrival in this country. A state franchise tax measured by properly apportioned gross receipts may be imposed upon a railroad company in respect of the company's receipts for services in handling imports and exports at its marine terminal.

Privilege Taxes

A state law requiring importers to take out a license to sell imported goods amounts to an indirect tax on imports and hence is unconstitutional. Likewise, a franchise tax upon foreign corporations engaged in importing nitrate and selling it in the original packages,a tax on sales by brokers and auctioneers of imported merchandise in original packages, and a tax on the sale of goods in foreign commerce consisting of an annual license fee plus a percentage of gross sales, have been held invalid. On the other hand, pilotage fees, a tax upon the gross sales of a purchaser from the importer, a license tax upon dealing in fish which, through processing, handling, and sale, have lost their distinctive character as imports, an annual license fee imposed on persons engaged in buying and selling foreign bills of exchange, and a tax upon the right of an alien to receive property as heir, legatee, or donee of a deceased person have been held not to be duties on imports or exports.

Property Taxes

Overruling a line of prior decisions which it thought misinterpreted the language of Brown v. Maryland, the Court now holds that the clause does not prevent a State from levying a nondiscriminatory, ad valorem property tax upon goods that are no longer in import transit. Thus, a company's inventory of imported tires maintained at its wholesale distribution warehouse could be included in the State's tax upon the entire inventory. The clause does not prohibit every "tax" with some impact upon imports or exports but reaches rather exactions directed only at imports or exports or commercial activity therein as such.

Inspection Laws

Inspection laws "are confined to such particulars as, in the estimation of the legislature and according to the customs of trade, are deemed necessary to fit the inspected article for the market, by giving the purchaser public assurance that the article is in that condition, and of that quality, which makes it merchantable and fit for use or consumption." In Turner v. Maryland, the Court listed as recognized elements of inspection laws, the "quality of the article, form, capacity, dimensions, and weight of package, mode of putting up, and marking and branding of various kinds . . ." It sustained as an inspection law a charge for storage and inspection imposed upon every hogshead of tobacco grown in the State and intended for export, which the law required to be brought to a state warehouse to be inspected and branded. The Court has cited this section as a recognition of a general right of the States to pass inspection laws, and to bring within their reach articles of interstate, as well as of foreign, commerce. But on the ground that, "it has never been regarded as within the legitimate scope of inspection laws to forbid trade in respect to any known article of commerce, irrespective of its condition and quality, merely on account of its intrinsic nature and the injurious consequence of its use or abuse," it held that a state law forbidding the importation of intoxicating liquors into the State could not be sustained as an inspection law.

Clause 3. Tonnage Duties, Keeping Troops, Making Compacts, War

Clause 3. No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

Tonnage Duties

The prohibition against tonnage duties embraces all taxes and duties, regardless of their name or form, whether measured by the tonnage of the vessel or not, which are in effect charges for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port. But it does not extend to charges made by state authority, even if graduated according to tonnage, for services rendered to the vessel, such as pilotage, towage, charges for loading and unloading cargoes, wharfage, or storage. For the purpose of determining wharfage charges, it is immaterial whether the wharf was built by the State, a municipal corporation, or an individual. Where the wharf was owned by a city, the fact that the city realized a profit beyond the amount expended did not render the toll objectionable. The services of harbor masters for which fees are allowed must be actually rendered, and a law permitting harbor masters or port wardens to impose a fee in all cases is void. A State may not levy a tonnage duty to defray the expenses of its quarantine system, but it may exact a fixed fee for examination of all vessels passing quarantine. A state license fee for ferrying on a navigable river is not a tonnage tax but rather is a proper exercise of the police power and the fact that a vessel is enrolled under federal law does not exempt it. In the State Tonnage Tax Cases, an annual tax on steamboats measured by their registered tonnage was held invalid despite the contention that it was a valid tax on the steamboat as property.

Keeping Troops

This provision contemplates the use of the State's military power to put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by civil authority, and the organization and maintenance of an active state militia is not a keeping of troops in time of peace within the prohibition of this clause.

Interstate Compacts

Background of Clause

Except for the single limitation that the consent of Congress must be obtained, the original inherent sovereign rights of the States to make compacts with each other was not surrendered under the Constitution. "The Compact," as the Supreme Court has put it, "adapts to our Union of sovereign States the age-old treaty-making power of independent sovereign nations." In American history, the compact technique can be traced back to the numerous controversies that arose over the ill-defined boundaries of the original colonies. These disputes were usually resolved by negotiation, with the resulting agreement subject to approval by the Crown. When the political ties with Britain were broken, the Articles of Confederation provided for appeal to Congress in all disputes between two or more States over boundaries or "any cause whatever" and required the approval of Congress for any "treaty confederation or alliance" to which a State should be a party.